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The Justifications for Nondegradation Programs in U.S. Environmental Law
Robert L. Glicksman*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The international law principle of non-regression requires that existing norms or
standards not be revised to reduce the protection of collective or individual rights.1
Within the European Union (EU), the non-regression principle requires member states to
ensure that setting common minimum standards in accordance with EU Directives does
not have the effect of lowering standards in individual member states.2 EU employment
legislation, for example, includes non-regression clauses providing that the
implementation of an EU Directive does not justify reducing the general level of worker
protection in the field covered by that Directive.3
The concept of non-regression is not one that is familiar to environmental law in
the United States. Nevertheless, Congress and federal agencies have adopted programs to
prevent degradation of existing high quality environments and to prevent revisions of
individual emissions restrictions by making them more lenient. The first programs are
known as nondegradation or anti-degradation programs.
The others preclude
“backsliding” by prohibiting slippage in performance by regulated entities complying
with regulations that are later loosened. The nondegradation and anti-backsliding
programs differ from the non-regression principle in that their justifications are not rooted
in a commitment to the protection of individual rights. Instead, the programs are based
on goals that include providing a safety net in the event that ambient quality-based
environmental standards are not as protective as assumed, protecting unique landscapes
of high recreational, cultural, or spiritual value, balancing environmental protection goals
with efforts to promote economic growth, preventing the development of pollution
havens, and spurring the development of more effective pollution control technology.
This chapter explores the history and current status of nondegradation and antibacksliding programs under U.S. water and air pollution control legislation. It describes
the justifications for these programs that appear to have prompted Congress and the
federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to adopt them. It also assesses
*

J.B. & Maurice C. Shapiro Professor of Environmental Law, The George Washington University Law
School.
1
Non Regression Principle Knowledge Forum,
http://www.iucn.org/about/work/programmes/environmental_law/elp_news/elp_news_archive/?5888/NON
-REGRESSION-PRINCIPLE-KNOWLEDGE-FORUM (19.8.11). See also Alice Donald, A Bill of Rights
for the UK? Why the Process Matters, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 494 (2010) (“[T]he principle of nonregression established by UN treaty bodies . . . require[es] that standards for human rights protection that
have already been adopted should not later be undone.”).
2
European Union Preparatory Acts, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
on the Right of Access to a Lawyer in Criminal Proceedings and on the Right to Communicate upon Arrest,
EU: COM(2011) 326, Art. 14.
3
Steve Peers, Non-regression Clauses: The Fig Leaf Has Fallen, 39 INDUSTRIAL L.J. 446 (2010).
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alternative, rights-based justifications for nondegradation programs, that, while not
reflected in federal environmental law in the U.S., may be supported by state
constitutional and common law theories. While these theories may support rights-based
nondegradation constraints in limited contexts, they are not likely to generate a broadbased set of nondegradation obligations that bind governments in the U.S.
II.

RIGHTS-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES

Neither the U.S. Constitution nor federal environmental statutes recognize an
enforceable individual right to a clean or healthy environment. Individual state laws are
more receptive to the creation and protection of such rights. Some state constitutions
recognize individual environmental rights, although those provisions may depend on
legislative implementation. Some state common law tort theories, which supplement
statutory environmental programs, are also rights-based.
A. Environmental Rights under Federal Law
As a matter of federal law, there is no right to any particular level of
environmental quality. Legislators in the 1960s and 1970s introduced bills in Congress to
provide constitutional status to environmental protection.4 The reluctance of the
American people to alter the Constitution, the rigorous process for doing so, and
confidence that legislation would produce the desired level of protection even without a
constitutional amendment helped defeat those bills.5 The conviction that legislative
protection was sufficient was not necessarily misguided, given the array of environmental
laws Congress adopted between 1969 and 1980 and the rigor with which courts enforced
statutes such as the National Environmental Policy Act.6 In addition, the beneficiaries of
environmental protection rights are not the kind of minority without effective access to
the legislative process for which constitutional protections have often been afforded.7
Others pressed for judicial recognition of a constitutional right to a clean
environment in the existing text of the Constitution, principally through the Ninth
Amendment’s insistence that the enumeration of certain rights does not “deny or
disparage” the recognition of other rights.8 The courts, however, were not receptive.9
There is no prospect for the foreseeable future of embedding in the Constitution a right to
a decent environment generally or to protection against environmental degradation.

4

See Oliver A. Houck, Foreword: The Missing Constitution, in PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW xxiii (James R. May ed., 2011).
5
Id. at xxiv. See also Carole L. Gallagher, The Movement to Create an Environmental Bill or Rights:
From Earth Day, 1970 to the Present, 9 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 107, 122-23 (1997) (arguing that
legislators believed that federal legislation precluded the need for a constitutional amendment).
6
Houck, supra note 4, at xxiv.
7
See ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 51 (6th ed. 2011).
8
U.S. CONST. amend. IX. See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 64 (2d ed. 1994).
9
See, e.g., Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971); Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532, 535
(S.D. Tex. 1972); Envtl. Def. Fund v. Corps of Eng’rs, 325 F. Supp. 728, 739 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
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The federal environmental statutes also lack rights-based protections as they
generally do not provide mechanisms to compensate injured individuals. The provision
that comes closest to recognizing individual environmental rights is the National
Environmental Policy Act’s recitation “that each person should enjoy a healthful
environment.”10 That provision, however, has been ignored by the courts and, along with
the rest of NEPA, given no substantive content.11 Indeed, Congress considered but
refused to enact a version of that provision that would have “recognize[d] that each
person has a fundamental and inalienable right to a healthful environment” precisely
because it wanted to avoid creation of a right that would lead to legal claims.12
B.

Environmental Rights under State Law

Efforts to constitutionalize a right to environmental protection have met with
more success in the states. According to one account, about half of the states recognize
environmental concern as an important policy or purport to provide a basic civil right to a
quality environment.13 Montana’s constitution, discussed below, probably contains the
strongest environmental provision found in any state.14 Often, however, enforcement of
these state constitutional rights is contingent on legislative implementation.15
Common law decisionmaking by state courts provides another basis for protecting
individuals from environmental harms. The justifications for abating and redressing
environmental harms differ depending on the theory pursued. Negligence liability is
fault-based and is imposed on those whose breach of an applicable duty of care results in
injury to the plaintiff. Trespass is clearly rights-based, but the right protected is a
landowner’s right to exclusive possession, not a right to a decent environment or to be
protected against threats to one’s health.16 Many courts and scholars regard nuisance law
as rooted in utilitarian principles that determine liability by assessing which party to a
dispute can avoid it at the least cost.17 Others argue that private nuisance law functions to
protect basic human rights such as health and the right to be left alone in one’s living
10

42 U.S.C. § 4331(c) (2006).
See Philip Michael Ferester, Revitalizing the National Environmental Policy Act: Substantive Law
Adaptations from NEPA’s Progeny, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 207, 208 (1992); Lucia A. Silecchia,
Environmental Ethics from the Perspective of NEPA and Catholic Social Teaching: Ecological Guidance
for the Twenty-First Century, 28 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 659, 796 (2004).
12
Oliver A. Houck, Is that All? A Review of the National Environmental Policy Act, An Agenda for the
Future, by Lynton Keith Caldwell, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 173, 182 (2000).
13
James R. May & William Romanowicz, Environmental Rights in State Constitutions, in PRINCIPLES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 306 (James R. May ed., 2011). For a complete listing of state
constitutional provisions recognizing environmental rights, see id. at 315-21.
14
Montana Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Montana Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 988 P.2d 1236, 1248 (Mont. 1999).
15
May & Romanowicz, supra note 13, at 313. See, e.g., Robb v. Shockoe Slip Found., 228 Va. 678, 324
S.E.2d 674 (1985); Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 311 A.2d 588 (Pa.
1973).
16
See Eric R. Claeys, Jefferson Meets Coase: Land-Use Torts, Law and Economics, and Natural Property
Rights, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1379, 1419 (2010) (describing trespass as a “rights-based tort”).
17
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (balancing gravity of the plaintiff’s harm against the utility
of the defendant’s conduct to determine liability in a private nuisance action).
11
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space.18 Private nuisance cases reflect a mix of the utilitarian and rights-based
approaches, but in any event, protects only those with interests in land.19 Public
nuisance, which is not linked to property ownership, is designed to protect a broader
range of community rights to health, safety, and welfare.20
Even if common law actions reflect rights-based protections, however, they are
incapable of providing the kind of broad-based governmental duties that constitutional
law provides. These actions are by definition piecemeal and liability against the
government may be impeded by sovereign immunity.
III.

THE ORIGINS AND CONTENT OF NONDEGRADATION
PROGRAMS FOR WATER AND AIR POLLUTION

AND

ANTI-BACKSLIDING

Statutory programs to prevent environmental degradation predate the adoption of
the major pollution laws such as the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act. Congress
eventually endorsed these programs in both statutes, although their scope and legal
consequences are not entirely clear, especially under the Clean Water Act.
Environmental statutes, and regulations issued by the federal Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), also prohibit backsliding by pollution sources who have complied with
regulatory restrictions that are later made less stringent for a larger class of sources.
A. Nondegradation in U.S. Environmental Law
Before the late 1960s, U.S. environmental law was largely a creature of state law.
State pollution control programs before the adoption of the Clean Air Act in 1970 and the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act in 1972 did not include a nondegradation policy.21
But the federal government adopted nondegradation programs for both water and air
pollution even before Congress passed those two laws.
1. Nondegradation and Water Pollution Control
Before EPA’s creation in 1970, the Department of the Interior adopted guidelines
to implement the 1965 Water Quality Act,22 which required all states to adopt water
quality standards consisting of use designations (such as drinking or fishing) and water

18

1 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER 30-31 (1986) (stating that “[t]his
group views nuisance law as protecting some version of unique human rights”).
19
See Robert G. Bone, Normative Theory and Legal Doctrine in American Nuisance Law: 1850 to 1920,
59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1101, 1226 (1986) (“Utilitarian arguments . . . still vie with arguments from individual
right” in resolution of nuisance cases).
20
See, e.g., Randall Abate, Public Nuisance Suits for the Climate Justice Movement: The Right Thing and
the Right, 85 WASH. L. REV. 197, 201 (2010) (arguing that public nuisance suits can help “secure human
rights-based relief for those disproportionately affected by climate change impacts”).
21
N. William Hines, A Decade of Nondegradation Policy in Congress and the Courts: The Erratic Pursuit
of Clean Air and Clean Water, 62 IOWA L. REV. 643, 654 (1977).
22
Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965).
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quality characteristics needed to permit those uses to occur.23 The guidelines provided
that “[i]n no case will standards providing for less than existing water quality be
acceptable,” and that standards provide for “[t]he maintenance and protection of quality
and use or uses of water now of a higher quality or of a quality suitable for present and
potential uses.”24 Unfortunately, enforcement of the guidelines was cursory.25
In 1968, Interior Secretary Stewart Udall endorsed the policy of preventing
degradation of existing clean water resources.26 The Secretary’s policy, however,
retreated from the absolute protection of existing water quality reflected in the 1966
guidelines.27 It required maintenance of waters whose quality was better than established
standards, unless a state could justify degradation based on necessary economic or social
development. Degradation would not be allowed, however, to interfere with or injure
designated uses then being made or which could be made of those waters.28
Despite the weakening of the 1966 guidelines, state governors and the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce complained that a nondegradation policy would unreasonably
restrict economic development and state enforcement of the guidelines lagged.29 By the
time Congress adopted the modern Clean Water Act in 1972, the water quality standards
of all fifty states nominally included versions of a nondegradation policy statement, but in
most states, nondegradation was little more than an unimplemented objective.30
The 1972 law said nothing about nondegradation policy. EPA, which had taken
over control of federal water quality programs, took the position that a nondegradation
policy was “consistent with the spirit, intent, and goals of the Act,” especially the goal of
restoring and maintaining the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation’s
waters.31 EPA refined the policy in 1975, creating the requirements that, with few
changes, remain in place today.32
In 1987, Congress cryptically addressed
23

GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 553.
Hines, supra note 21, at 658.
25
See Mary A. Stitts, Note, The Ever-Changing Balance of Power in Interstate Water Pollution: Do
Affected States Have Anything to Say After Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1341, 1356
(1993).
26
Lauren Kalisek, The Principle of Antidegradation and Its Place in Texas Water Quality Permitting, 41
TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 4 (2010). See also Jeffrey M. Gaba, Federal Supervision of State Water Quality
Standards Under the Clean Water Act, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1189-90 (1983) [hereinafter Gaba, Federal
Supervision]; Michael C. Blumm & William Warnock, Roads Not Taken: EPA vs. Clean Water, 33 ENVTL.
L. 79, 104 (2003).
27
Hines, supra note 21, at 659.
28
Kalisek, supra note 26, at 5-6. See 40 Fed. Reg, 55340 (Nov. 28, 1975).
29
Michael Snyder, Note, Nondegradation of Water Quality: The Need for Effective Action, 50 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 890, 893, 897 (1975).
30
Hines, supra note 21, at 659-60.
31
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006). See EPA, Questions and Answers on Antidegradation 1 (Aug. 1985)
[hereinafter Qs & As].
32
40 C.F.R. § 131.12. For discussion of the policy, see John Harleston, What Is Antidegradation Policy:
Does Anyone Know?, 5 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 33, 47 (1996); John L. Horwich, Water Quality Nondegradation
in Montana: Is Any Deterioration Too Much?, 14 PUB. LAND L. REV. 145, 158-60 (1993).
24
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nondegradation of water quality for the first time, providing that for waters whose quality
exceeds levels necessary to protect the designated use, any effluent limitation based on a
total maximum daily load33 may be revised only if the revision “is subject to and
consistent with the anti-degradation policy established under this section.”34 The statute,
which still governs nondegradation policy, simply incorporates by reference EPA’s prior
administrative policy.35
A state’s anti-degradation policy is part of the water quality standards it must
adopt and enforce.36 EPA regulations currently provide that each state must adopt an
anti-degradation policy that includes three elements. First, existing instream water uses
and the level of water quality necessary to protect those uses must be maintained and
protected. According to the Supreme Court, the CWA’s anti-degradation policy requires
that “state standards be sufficient to maintain existing beneficial uses of navigable waters,
preventing their further degradation.”37 Second, the state must maintain water quality
that exceeds levels necessary to support propagation of fish and wildlife, and water
recreation,38 unless allowing lower water quality is necessary to accommodate important
economic or social development. Even then, water quality standards must fully protect
existing uses. In addition, the state must assure achievement of the highest statutory and
regulatory requirements for all point sources and all cost-effective and reasonable best
management practices for nonpoint sources. Third, the state must maintain quality in
high quality waters that constitute an “outstanding National resource,” including waters
of national and state parks and wildlife refuges and waters of “exceptional recreational or
ecological significance.”39 In short, the policy requires different levels of protection for
three types of waters. Under Tier 1, existing uses must be maintained in all waters.
Under Tier 2, for high-quality waters that exceed fishable/swimmable quality,
degradation of water quality will be allowed only if it is necessary to accommodate
important social or economic development in the region. Degradation of water quality is
completely prohibited for Tier 3, Outstanding National Resource Waters.40
The anti-degradation policy may affect states administering the Clean Water Act
or discharging sources in several circumstances. States must review and, if appropriate,
revise their water quality standards at least once every three years. Any such revisions
33

A total maximum daily load is the maximum aggregate pollution loading that the receiving water is
capable of assimilating without violating applicable water quality standards by creating excessive pollutant
concentrations or interfering with designated uses. GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 627.
34
33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4)(B) (2006).
35
Jeffrey Gaba, New Sources, New Growth and the Clean Water Act, 55 ALA. L. REV. 651, 672 (2004)
[hereinafter New Growth]. See also PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dep’t of Ecology, 511
U.S. 700, 718 (1994).
36
PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 718-19 (1994).
37
Id. at 705. See also Qs & As, supra note 31, at 3 (stating that “no activity is allowable . . . which could
partially or completely eliminate any existing use”).
38
Aside from an unrealistic no discharge goal, the Clean Water Act’s primary goal is to achieve, wherever
attainable, “water quality which provides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife
and provides for recreation in and on the water . . . .” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (2006).
39
40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a).
40
Kalisek, supra note 26, at 9.
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must comply with the anti-degradation policy. If a state issues a discharge permit for a
point source which violates the antidegradation policy, EPA may veto the permit.41 EPA
also may disapprove total maximum daily loads that violate the policy. The Act requires
those seeking a federal license or permit to conduct an activity which may result in a
discharge (such as operation of a hydropower plant or the filling of waters) to provide the
federal permitting authority with a certification that the discharge will comply with state
water quality standards. Without such a certification, the federal agency may not issue
the license or permit.42 Activities covered by this certification requirement include
discharges requiring a Clean Water Act permit in a state in which EPA, rather than a
state, administers the permit program.43 If a state issues a certification for an EPA-issued
discharge permit which fails to comply with the anti-degradation policy, EPA may add
more stringent effluent limitations to ensure compliance with the policy.44 If a state fails
to adopt an anti-degradation policy, EPA may adopt one for the state.45
The Clean Water Act’s anti-degradation policy is not a precise set of instructions
to EPA or the states.46 Its application has been described as “at best, obscure,” and as
lacking in substantive content.47 One important question is whether the policy is
designed to protect existing uses or existing water quality. The answer seems to be both,
but in different circumstances. The Tier 1 provisions are directed at protection of
existing uses, while the Tier 2 component aims to protect the quality of high quality
waters.48 Tier 3 also focuses on protection of water quality.
Another question is how to define degradation that violates the policy. According
to one critic, EPA’s regulations fail to recognize the relevance of that question.49 EPA
apparently allows states to invoke Tier 2 protections when activities result in
“significant” degradation” of water quality, invoking the agency’s inherent authority to

41

33 U.S.C. § 1342(d) (2006).
33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2006).
43
Most states have received EPA approval to administer at least portions of the Clean Water Act’s National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit program. EPA, State Program Status,
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/statestats.cfm.
44
Qs & As, supra note 31, at 2.
45
Id. at 1. States may allow other activities to trigger anti-degradation review, such as non-point source
pollution. Kent Modesitt, Antidegradation: A Lost Cause or the Next Cause?, 2 U. DENV. WATER L. REV.
189, 193-94 (1999).
46
Harleston, supra note 32, at, 52-53 (“In its almost thirty years of existence, few details of implementing
antidegradation have been expressed.”).
47
Jeffrey M. Gaba, Generally Illegal: NPDES General Permits Under the Clean Water Act, 31 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 409, 454 (2007) [hereinafter Gaba, General Permits]. See also Robert W. Adler,
Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203,
292 (1999) (“the current [CWA antidegradation] program . . . is so vague as to defy clear explanation”).
48
Gaba, Federal Supervision, supra note 26, at 1192.
49
Harleston, supra note 32, at 57.
42
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avoid regulating de minimis environmental threats.50 State definitions of the point at
which water quality impairment triggers anti-degradation review are inconsistent.51
The policy is also less than clear in distinguishing among the three tiers of waters
it covers. It does not provide adequate guidance on how to distinguish Tier 1 and Tier 2
waters.52 Likewise, the definition of Outstanding National Resource Waters is unclear.53
EPA has left ONWR designation to state discretion, which some believe has provided
inadequate protection to some of the nation’s most important aquatic resources.54
Another flaw in the policy is its failure to describe when Tier 2 high-quality
waters may be degraded “to accommodate important economic or social development.”55
Absent constraints, this exception to the prohibition on degradation threatens to swallow
the rule.56 According to EPA, the phrase seeks to convey “a general concept regarding
what level of social and economic development could be used to justify a change in high
quality waters. Any more exact meaning will evolve through case-by-case application”
by the state.57 The burden of demonstrating economic necessity “will be very high.”58
According to one assessment, EPA’s proclivity for leaving the anti-degradation
policy vague, and for affording broad implementation discretion to the states, has
precluded the development of a consistent national anti-degradation policy.59 In addition
to the resulting inconsistencies, troublesome gaps have developed, including exclusion of
important pollution sources. Montana, among other states, exempted nonpoint sources
from the program.60 EPA once took the position that “[n]onpoint source activities are not
exempt from the provisions of the antidegradation policy.”61 In this case, however, it
approved Montana’s exemption, and a court approved. Noting that EPA lacks the
authority to regulate nonpoint source discharges, the court upheld as reasonable EPA’s
determination that Montana properly exempted nonpoint source discharges from anti50

Gaba, New Growth, supra note 35, at 677. See Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Horinko, 279 F. Supp. 2d
732, 767-68 (S.D. W. Va. 2003). See also Modesitt, supra note __, at 217 (noting that EPA regional office
supported the use of a significance determination).
51
See Modesitt, supra note 45, at 217 (noting that state approaches vary).
52
Gaba, General Permits, supra note 47, at 454. See also Gaba, New Growth, supra note 35, at 675
(“Unfortunately, the difference between Tier 1 and Tier 2 waters may, in many cases, be more
metaphysical than biological.”).
53
John A. Chilson, Keeping Clean Waters Clean: Making the Clean Water Act’s Antidegradation Policy
Work, 32 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 545, 553-55 (1999).
54
Adler, supra note 47, at 287.
55
See Katherine Zogas, Comment, The Clean Water Act’s Antidegradation Policy: Has It Been
“Dumped”?, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 209, 229-30 (2008); Gaba, New Growth, supra note 35, at 686.
56
Stitts, supra note 25, at 1359.
57
Qs & As, supra note 31, at 8.
58
Kalisek, supra note 26, at 12 (quoting EPA, Water Quality Standards Handbook, at § 4.5 (2d ed. 1993)).
59
Harleston, supra note 32, at 77.
60
Other states have taken the same approach. See Douglas R. Williams, When Voluntary, Incentive-Based
Controls Fail: Structuring a Regulatory Response to Agricultural Nonpoint Source Water Pollution, 9
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 21, 40 (2002).
61
Qs & As, supra note 31, at 6.
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degradation review.62 This left high-quality waters in rural areas unprotected from major
sources of water pollution, a result arguably inconsistent with the Act’s goal of
preserving and restoring the integrity of the nation’s waters.63 The court’s decision
means there is no effective mandatory control over nonpoint source pollution affecting
high-quality streams. The anti-degradation policy also may fail to protect against
cumulative effects of multiple discharges that impair existing water quality.64
2.

Nondegradation and Air Pollution Control

Before EPA’s creation, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW)
adopted nondegradation guidelines for air quality under the Air Quality Act of 1967.65
That Act directed the states, subject to HEW’s approval, to adopt ambient air quality
standards defining the maximum levels of pollution needed to maintain public health.66
The guidelines stated that standards resulting in significant deterioration of air quality
would conflict with the statutory purpose to “protect and enhance” air quality.67
When Congress adopted the Clean Air Act in 1970, it transferred responsibility to
adopt air quality standards to EPA,68 leaving the states responsible for achieving the
standards through state implementation plans (SIPs) that imposed enforceable emission
limitations on individual sources.69 EPA insisted that it lacked the authority under the
Act to adopt nondegradation rules.70 In Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus,71 an environmental
group challenged EPA’s refusal to require SIPs to prevent degradation in existing clear
air areas. The district court ruled for the plaintiffs, reasoning that the statutory purpose
“to protect and enhance” air quality to promote public health and welfare reflected
Congress’ intent “to improve the quality of the nation’s air and to prevent deterioration of
that air quality, no matter how presently pure that quality in some sections of the country
happens to be.”72 EPA’s decision to allow the states to submit SIPs that lacked
nondegradation protections was therefore invalid. The decision was upheld on appeal.
In 1974, EPA issued regulations requiring states to conform their SIPs to a new
The
PSD program to prevent significant deterioration of clean air resources.73
regulations provided for three classes of areas with air cleaner than required by the
62

Am. Wildlands v. Browner, 260 F.3d 1192, 1198 (10th Cir. 2001).
Blumm & Warnock, supra note 26, at 108-09.
64
See Adler, supra note 47, at 285.
65
Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485.
66
GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 401.
67
Hines, supra note 21, at 660.
68
42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-7409 (2006).
69
Id. § 7410.
70
Hines, supra note 21, at 663; Richard B. Stewart, The Development of Administrative and QuasiConstitutional Law in Judicial Review of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from The Clean Air Act,
62 IOWA L. REV. 713, 743 (1977) [hereinafter Stewart, Quasi-Constitutional Law].
71
344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd without opinion, 4 Env’t Rep. Cas. 1815 (D.C. Cir. 1972), aff’d by
an equally divided court sub nom. Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973).
72
Id. at 255.
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39 Fed. Reg. 42509 (Dec. 5, 1974).
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national ambient air quality standards for particulate matter and sulfur dioxide, and
prescribed increments of allowable deterioration which were greatest in Class III areas
and smallest in Class I areas. In Class II areas, deterioration accompanying moderate
growth would be considered insignificant. Environmental groups, regulated sources, and
some states challenged the regulations, but the court upheld them.74
Following judicial approval of EPA’s new PSD program, Congress amended the
Clean Air Act in 1977 and codified the program, which remains in effect today.75 The
statute requires every SIP to include emission limitations and other measures to prevent
significant deterioration of air quality in areas with quality better than required by the
national ambient air quality standards. The statute requires that certain national parks and
wilderness areas be designated as mandatory Class I areas. All other PSD areas are
designated as Class II, but the states may redesignate them to Class I or Class III (with
some restrictions). The statute specifies the permissible amount of deterioration of
particulate matter and sulfur dioxide for all three classes, with the largest increments of
deterioration applying to Class III areas and the smallest to Class I areas.76 The
increments are calculated as percentages of the national ambient air quality standards.
A permit program for stationary sources (called new source review) provides the
main mechanism for protecting existing clean air resources. No new or modified major
emitting facility may be constructed in a PSD area unless it has received a permit from
the state in which it is located. A permit applicant must show that its emissions will not
cause or contribute to significant deterioration of existing clean air resources by
exceeding the applicable PSD increment or the national ambient air quality standards.77
In addition, permit holders must use the best available pollution control technology,
determined on a source-by-source basis, taking into account energy, environmental, and
economic impacts.78 The PSD program thus seeks to force sources to cut emissions
through improved pollution controls or changes in production processes.79 Unlike the
Clean Water Act policy, the program creates “an antidegradation standard that is clear,
precise, and objective with a narrow range of permissible interpretations.”80
B. Anti-backsliding in U.S. Environmental Law
74

Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. granted sub nom. Montana Power Co. v. EPA,
430 U.S. 953 (1977), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 959 (1977), vacated and remanded for reconsideration, 434
U.S. 809 (1977).
75
Craig N. Oren, Prevention of Significant Deterioration: Control-Compelling Versus Site-Shifting, 74
IOWA L. REV. 1, 4 (1988) [hereinafter Control-Compelling]; Stewart, Quasi-Constitutional Law, supra note
70, at 745. For discussion of the PSD provisions, see Craig N. Oren, Clearing the Air: The McCubbinsNoll-Weingast Hypothesis and the Clean Air Act, 9 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 45 (1989); John-Mark Stensvaag,
Preventing Significant Deterioration under the Clean Air Act: Area Classification, Initial Allocation, and
Redesignation, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. 10008 (2011).
76
42 U.S.C. §§ 7471-7474 (2006).
77
Id. § 7475(a)(1), (3); Oren, Control-Compelling, supra note 75, at 39-40.
78
42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(a)(4), 7479(3) (2006).
79
Oren, Control-Compelling, supra note 75, at 29.
80
Stitts, supra note 25, at 1368.
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Anti-backsliding differs from nondegradation. Degradation involves changes in
ambient quality, while backsliding relates to changes in permitted discharge limits.81
Anti-backsliding restrictions preclude regulators from loosening control requirements on
sources that have already proved capable of complying with more stringent controls.
Environmental statutes are typically designed to improve environmental quality
over time. The Clean Water Act seeks to reach its ultimate goal of eliminating all point
source discharges and its interim goal of fishable-swimmable water quality82 by requiring
regulated sources to comply with increasingly stringent discharge controls.83 Likewise, a
principal Clean Air Act goal is to “enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources,”84
and the statute strives to improve air quality in nonattainment areas that have air quality
worse than what is required to protect the public health and welfare.85 Yet, as one court
has indicated, pollution controls do not invariably become more stringent. “In some
instances new restrictions are more lax than old ones covering equivalent effluents. This
raises the question of what happens when a permit holder asks, at the time of renewal or
reissuance, to get the benefit of the new rule – to ‘backslide.’”86 Both water and air
pollution laws in the U.S. limit backsliding.
1.

Anti-Backsliding and U.S. Water Pollution Control

The Clean Water Act authorizes EPA to issue enforceable effluent limitations for
classes of point sources based on the best available control technology for the class.87
Because adopting regulations for all point source categories was a lengthy process,
however, Congress authorized permit-issuing agencies to impose source-specific
limitations determined on the basis of the exercise of the agency’s best professional
judgment (BPJ).88 When EPA issued regulations containing category-wide effluent
limitations that were less stringent than those found in BPJ permits for sources in that
industry, the question became whether a permitting agency could amend the BPJ permit
by substituting the less stringent regulatory limitation.89 For the most part, EPA said no.
EPA adopted its first anti-backsliding rule in 1979.90 Congress codified EPA’s
policy in the 1987 amendments to the Clean Water Act at the same time as it endorsed
EPA’s anti-degradation policy. The Act generally prohibits EPA from allowing permit
holders to backslide from BPJ-based discharge limitations or limitations imposed to
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Mark C. Van Putten, The Dilution of the Clean Water Act, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 863, 895 (1986).
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006).
83
Id. §§ 1311(b), 1314(b).
84
42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2006).
85
Id. §§ 7501-7515.
86
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156, 219 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
87
33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b), 1314(b) (2006); E.I du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977).
88
33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1)(B) (2006).
89
Van Putten, supra note 81, at 883.
90
44 Fed. Reg. 32854 (1979); 33 C.F.R. § 122.15(i) (1986).
82
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comply with state water quality standards.91 Backsliding is allowed if a discharger has
been unable to meet the effluent limits in its permits despite installation and maintenance
of the required control technology, facility alterations or additions justify a less stringent
limitation, new information is available that would have justified a less stringent
limitation, or events over which the permit holder has no control and for which no
reasonable remedy is available justify backsliding.92 A reissued permit may never
contain effluent limitations less stringent than the applicable regulatory limitations for
that industry. Backsliding is also forbidden if it could cause violation of a state water
quality standard, including the anti-degradation policy.93 Thus, the anti-backsliding
provisions supplement and support the anti-degradation program.94
2.

Anti-Backsliding and U.S. Air Pollution Control

The Clean Air Act also limits backsliding. If EPA relaxes an ambient air quality
standard, it must still require controls not less stringent than the controls applicable to
areas designated nonattainment before the relaxation.95 Similarly, no control requirement
in effect or required by a SIP that was in effect before the 1990 amendments in any
nonattainment area may be modified “unless the modification insures equivalent or
greater emission reductions” of the pollutant for which the area is nonattainment.96
IV.

NON-RIGHTS-BASED JUSTIFICATION
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

FOR

NONDEGRADATION DUTIES

IN

U.S.

Although nondegradation laws could be based on individual rights to a clean
environment, neither Congress nor EPA has offered that rationale as the basis for
adopting them. Instead, the justifications advanced for nondegradation provisions
include providing a margin of safety to offset the risk that regulations will not provide the
desired level of protection, protecting special value natural resources, preventing the
movement of industry to areas with superior environmental quality, preventing interstate
pollution, and preserving opportunities for future economic growth. Anti-backsliding
provisions seek to force regulated sources to achieve the highest level of pollution control
of which they are capable.
A.

Nondegradation and Non-Rights-Based Justifications

91

33 U.S.C. § 1342(o)(1) (2006). EPA’s implementing regulations are at 40 C.F.R. § 122.44 (l)(2). See
generally Melissa A Thorne, Antibacksliding: Understanding One of the Most Misunderstood Provisions of
the Clean Water Act, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. 10322 (2001). For a slide presentation on the operation of the
CWA’s anti-backsliding rules prepared by EPA, see http://www.crwp.org/pdf_files/antibacksliding.pdf.
92
33 U.S.C. § 1342(o)(2) (2006).
93
Id. § 1342(o)(3). The statute also precludes backsliding in waters that do not yet comply with state water
quality standards. See id. § 1313 (d)(4)(A).
94
Walter G. Wright, Jr., The Federal/Arkansas Water Pollution Control Programs: Past. Present, and
Future, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 541, 624 n.508 (2001).
95
42 U.S.C. § 7502(e) (2006).
96
Id. § 7515. See Casey Roberts, New York v. EPA: State Response to a Federal Regulatory Rollback, 33
ECOLOGY L.Q. 613 (2006).
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1.

Nondegradation to Provide a Margin of Safety

The Clean Air and Water Acts both require the adoption of ambient quality
standards to provide a minimally acceptable level of environmental quality. The Air Act
requires that EPA adopt primary standards that are requisite to protect the public health
with an adequate margin of safety and secondary standards that protect the public welfare
from known or anticipated adverse effects associated with air pollution.97 The Water Act
requires states to adopt water quality standards that assure that pollutant concentrations
will protect designated uses.98 Both sets of standards establish maximum permissible
concentrations of pollutants in the air or water, expressed quantitatively or narratively.
Environmental regulation often proceeds in the face of scientific uncertainty. As
a result, regulators may determine that a particular concentration level is sufficient to
achieve the desired level of protection, only to discover later that adverse effects occur at
lower pollution concentrations than once believed. EPA has amended the national
ambient air quality standards for pollutants such as lead and ozone by lowering the
maximum permissible pollutant concentrations because the pre-existing standards were
not as protective as the agency once believed or as the law requires.
Nondegradation rules can protect against the risk that ambient standards are not as
protective as the agency assumed when it adopted them; they can protect against
misjudgments about the scope of environmental risk. The Clean Air Act’s PSD program
was adopted with this function, among others, in mind. The program’s purposes include
protecting public health “from any actual or potential adverse effect which in [EPA’s]
judgment may reasonably be anticipated to occur from air pollution . . . notwithstanding
attainment and maintenance of all national ambient air quality standards.”99
Legislators in 1977 were wary of relying on the identification of harmless
concentrations of air pollution and suspected that the only way to eliminate health risks
would be to set ambient standards at zero. Not willing to go that far, supporters of the
PSD program sought to minimize risk by keeping pollutant concentrations lower than
required by air quality standards in areas that already had clean air.100 The program
would provide a “margin of safety” if pollution actually caused harm at concentrations
lower than any threshold levels identified by EPA or if EPA refused for economic
reasons to tighten the standards despite new evidence that existing standards were not
sufficiently protective.101 PSD’s supporters also argued that the program was necessary
because the national standards did not cover damaging pollutants such as sulfates that
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42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (2006).
33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (2006).
99
42 U.S.C. § 7470(1) (2006).
100
David P. Currie, Nondegradation and Visibility Under the Clean Air Act, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 48, 77
(1980).
101
See Oren, Control-Compelling, supra note 75, at 64.
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cause acid rain and failed to account for the synergistic effects of multiple pollutants.102
Accordingly, nondegradation requirements amount to an indirect attack on the adequacy
of existing ambient quality standards.103
2.

Nondegradation to Protect High-Value Natural Resources

A second function of nondegradation constraints is to protect highly valued
natural resources that may be at risk from exposure to pollutant concentrations that are
lower than those needed to protect public health. Both the Clean Air and Water Act
programs seek to promote that goal. U.S. nondegradation policy can be viewed “as the
pollution control analogue to wilderness protection in public lands management.”104
While nondegradation policy in the pollution context is not as restrictive as constraints on
use of wilderness areas under the Wilderness Act of 1964, nondegradation policy and
wilderness protection reflect a common preservationist impulse.
One of the purposes of the Clean Air Act’s PSD program is to preserve, protect,
and enhance air quality in national parks, monuments, seashores, and wilderness areas, as
well as other areas of “special” natural, recreational, scenic, or historic value.105 The Act
provides for both primary, health-based air quality standards and secondary, welfarebased standards. Because adverse effects on welfare may occur at concentrations lower
than those that trigger health risks, the secondary standards generally will be more
stringent than the primary standards.106 Even then, secondary standards may not be
adequate to protect particularly vulnerable resources, or EPA may have underestimated
how clean the air needs to be to protect those resources.
During congressional debate, supporters of the PSD program emphasized the
benefits of protecting parks from air pollution, claiming that preservation of clean air
quality would prevent damage that would occur even at pollution concentrations allowed
by the national ambient air quality standards.107 Degradation of air quality in national
parks and wilderness areas would interfere with scenic vistas in places like the Grand
Canyon or damage unique natural resources, frustrating the opportunities for
preservation, recreation, and spiritual renewal that justified creation of the national parks
and other protected areas.108 The Clean Water Act’s anti-degradation policy serves the
same function through its prohibition on water quality degradation in Outstanding
National Resource Waters. Enhanced protections are particularly critical if resource
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Id. at 60, 82.
Stewart, Quasi-Constitutional Law, supra note 70, at 742 n.144.
104
Hines, supra note 21, at 645.
105
42 U.S.C. § 7470(2). See generally Craig N. Oren, The Protection of Parklands from Increased Air
Pollution: A Look at Current Policy, 13 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313 (1989) [hereinafter Oren, Parklands].
106
DAVID WOOLEY & ELIZABETH MORSS, CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK, Appendix C (2011). In practice,
EPA rarely establishes separate secondary standards. See GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 406.
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Oren, Parklands, supra note 105, at 329.
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Id. at 315, 346-47.
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damage is expected to be irreversible or would interfere with the broader functioning of
critical ecosystem services.109
3.

Nondegradation to Prevent the Development of Pollution Havens

Without a nondegradation policy, areas with relatively clean air or water quality
would have a greater capacity to assimilate pollution without violating applicable
ambient standards than would more polluted areas. Under both the Clean Air and Water
Acts, pollution control requirements tend to be most stringent in highly polluted areas
that are in violation of ambient quality standards. The Clean Air Act imposes rigorous
controls on pollution sources in nonattainment areas,110 and the stringency of the controls
tends to increase in relation to the degree of noncompliance.111 The Clean Water Act
requires states whose waters are more polluted than state water quality standards allow to
establish TMDLs that result in stringent aggregate effluent limitations for sources
dumping into those impaired waters.112 Absent nondegradation programs, new industrial
sources with choices about where to locate (putting other factors aside) would tend to
choose areas with less stringent pollution controls to reduce costs of operation.113 The
result would be not only degradation of existing good environmental quality, but also an
exodus of business from industrialized areas with high levels of pollution to more remote,
cleaner areas. One would expect politicians representing industrialized areas to try to
remove regulatory incentives that would likely result in a loss of jobs and tax revenues.
Nondegradation provisions can prevent “pollution havens” by removing
incentives that would drive industry to clean areas if they were allowed to deteriorate to
minimal levels required by ambient standards. They can prevent states in a federal
system from selecting suboptimal environmental quality levels due to market failure. A
state would be unlikely to adopt pollution controls needed to prevent deterioration of
good environmental quality even if the national interest would benefit from doing so
because of a classic prisoner’s dilemma. States with high air quality would bear most of
the costs of maintaining it, while recouping only a small portion of the benefits.114 “Each
state, fearing undercutting by a state competing for economic development, would be
reluctant to adopt a potentially disabling policy absent some assurance about what other
states intended to do. All states would thus be paralyzed to act.”115
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See, e.g., ROBERT W. ADLER, JESSICA C. LANDMAN & DIANE M. CAMERON, THE CLEAN WATER ACT: 20
YEARS LATER 200 (1993) (noting that headwater tributaries of larger watersheds can “provide clean base
flow and critical spawning and rearing habitat to support downstream flows”).
110
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c) (2006) (listing requirements for SIPs that cover nonattainment areas).
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See, e.g., id. § 7511a.
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33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2006).
113
See Snyder, supra note 29, at 891-92.
114
Stewart, Quasi-Constitutional Law, supra note 70, at 747.
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Hines, supra note 21, at 654. See also Stewart, Quasi-Constitutional Law, supra note 70, at 747 (“In the
absence of a nondegradation requirement, ‘clean’ states might compete with one another for new
development . . .”).
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These concerns motivated Congress to adopt the Clean Air Act’s PSD program,
as it sought to neutralize the advantages that areas with superior air quality might have in
attracting industry. Some commentators attributed the passage of the PSD program in
1977 to an effort by industrialized states to limit economic growth in the Sunbelt.116
4.

Nondegradation to Prevent Interstate Pollution

The PSD program sought to prevent activities in one state from harming other
states in another way. Some PSD supporters claimed that it would reduce interstate
pollution from new sources, preventing areas from becoming “‘dumping grounds’ for the
pollution caused by industrial sources in other regions.”117 The argument was apparently
persuasive. One of the goals of the program is “to assure that emissions from any sources
in any State will not interfere with any portion of the applicable implementation program
to prevent significant deterioration of air quality for any other State.”118
5.

Nondegradation to Preserve Economic Growth Opportunities

A related justification is that a nondegradation program is a temporary device to
postpone exploitation of good environmental quality until the potential for economic
growth justifies the resulting degradation. According to one expert on air pollution law,
there is reason to believe that some PSD supporters held this view.119 This argument for
postponing exploitation “draws from the conservationist, rather than the preservationist,
roots of the environmental movement”120 in that the former supported governmental
management of natural resource use to maximize economic return over time.121
B.

Anti-Backsliding and Non-Rights-Based Justifications

Anti-backsliding provisions have a different justification, stemming, at least in
large part, from the philosophy reflected in the technology-based standards that dominate
U.S. pollution laws. Technology-based regulation is designed to commit the nation and
particular dischargers to “do the best they can” to reduce environmental harm “by
requiring the most protection achievable by current technologies unless ‘costs are
disruptive or extraordinary.’”122 Senator Birch Bayh explained that the Clean Water
Act’s technology-based effluent limitations were designed to “force industry to do the
best job it can do to clean up the nation’s water and to keep making progress without
116

Oren, Control-Compelling, supra note 70, at 105, 111.
Id. at 85.
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See Hines, supra note 21, at 646.
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Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1581 (2002) (“Simply put, the idea is that we should do the best we
can to mitigate pollution we believe to be harmful.”)
117

16

To be published as chapter in
LE PRINCIPE DE NON-REGRÉSSION EN DROIT DE L’ENVIRONNEMENT
(M. Prieur & G. Sozzo, eds.)
incurring such massive costs that economic chaos would result.”123 This commitment is
not rights-based. As two prominent scholars have noted in the context of worker health
and safety regulation, “[a]cknowledging that society cannot vest workers with an
unqualified right to an absolutely safe workplace, one may rationally assert that workers
do have a right to insist that employers ‘do the best they can’ to protect human health.”124
Allowing backsliding to occur would be inconsistent with both polluters’
commitment to control discharges to the full extent of their technological capacities and
with the statutory goals of enhancing environmental quality over time.125 A discharger
that has exceeded compliance levels required by across-the-board regulations has
demonstrated its technological and economic capabilities to meet the more stringent
requirements. The technology-based thrust of the statutes would be frustrated if controls
for such a discharger were relaxed simply because EPA or a state agency determined that
the industry as a whole was not capable of meeting the more stringent control levels.126
Nevertheless, the “do the best you can” rationale does not dictate an absolute ban on
backsliding. When Congress decided to codify anti-backsliding requirements in the
Clean Water Act in 1987, it chose to allow permit modifications when doing so will not
compromise the overall commitment to requiring maximum feasible levels of control.
These include cases in which previous permit requirements disproportionately burden a
permittee,127 facility modifications justify less stringent controls, circumstances beyond
the permit holder’s control make compliance impossible, information unavailable at the
time of permit issuance indicates that compliance is impossible, or a mistake of fact or
law has been discovered.128
C.

Balancing Environmental Protection and Economic Growth

Nondegradation programs seek to balance protection of existing clean air and
water quality and continued economic growth. A goal of the Clean Air Act’s PSD
program is to “insure that economic growth will occur in a manner consistent with the
preservation of existing clean air resources.”129 The level of protection required depends
on the classification of a particular PSD area. With the exception of some national parks
and other highly protected federal lands, all PSD areas begin as Class 2 areas which do
not receive the highest level of protection. States may redesignate PSD areas downward
based on economic and social considerations, although the amount of permissible
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deterioration is limited even in Class areas.130 Under the Clean Water Act’s policy,
degradation of Tier 2 waters is allowed if necessary to accommodate important social and
economic development. Under this approach, “nondegradation policy does not make
existing resource quality an absolute minimum.”131 The result is “a flexible, site-specific
consideration of the economic justifications and social need for water quality degradation
in light of available alternatives and the significance of the predicted degradation.”132
EPA’s failure to define important economic and social development has given states
broad discretion to endorse degradation of Tier 2 waters, as long as existing uses are not
prevented or state water quality standards otherwise violated.133
Nondegradation policies, then, can be viewed as a way to achieve efficient
resource allocation. Degradation is allowed if the value of the economic development
that causes it exceeds the resulting marginal decline in the value of the degraded
resource. Nondegradation advocates have even couched these programs as job creators,
arguing that they create opportunities for new sources and accompanying jobs increases
by requiring tighter source controls and low ambient concentrations in clean areas.134
V.

THE POTENTIAL FOR A RIGHTS-BASED NONDEGRADATION POLICY IN THE U.S.

Although U.S. statutory protections against environmental degradation are not
rights-based, several sources of law might provide a foundation for bolstering efforts to
build a rights-based model in the U.S. These include constitutional and common law. At
present, neither source provides strong support for rights-based nondegradation
principles, but the potential for their evolution in that direction exists.
A. Constitutional Theories
Although rights-based arguments for nondegradation programs are not firmly
rooted in constitutional principles, they can provide policy support for these programs.
The present generation’s ethical duty to preserve natural resources from irreversible
degradation for the benefit of future generations dates was endorsed by the U.S.
conservation movement of the late 19th century.135 Nondegradation policy is rooted in
the obligation to protect the interests of future generations. As one early observer noted,
“[w]hile the nondegradation principle does not rely solely on philosophical grounds for
its justification, . . . the ethical force of the idea best explains the actions taken.”136
By preserving a diversity of environments, nondegradation policy can also
promote freedom of expression. Pristine environments can spur spiritual revitalization,
130
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ease the pressures of urban life, and foster aesthetic, social, and political views that differ
from those associated with urban life.137 Nondegradation policies “vindicate powerful
interests in environmental diversity that can persuasively claim to transcend contingent
judgments about economic efficiency or subjective value preferences, and that can secure
basic values which are implicit in the first amendment.”138
Rights-based justifications for nondegradation policies are not merely theoretical.
Montana has constitutionalized protections against environmental degradation. Its
constitution lists the right to a clean environment as an “inalienable right,” providing:
All persons are born free and have certain inalienable rights. They include the
right to a clean and healthful environment and the rights of pursuing life’s basic
necessities, enjoying and defending their lives and liberties, . . . and seeking their
safety, health and happiness in all lawful ways. In enjoying these rights, all
persons recognize corresponding responsibilities.139
The Montana constitution, endorsing intergenerational equity norms, also provides that
“[t]he state and each person shall maintain and improve a clean and healthful
environment in Montana for present and future generations.”140 It requires the legislature
to “provide adequate remedies for the protection of the environmental life support system
from degradation and provide adequate remedies to prevent unreasonable depletion and
degradation of natural resources.”141 These rights are not absolute. The constitution
prohibits only “unreasonable” resource degradation. Similarly, the state’s antidegradation statute permits degradation of high-quality waters by projects that will result
in “important economic or social development.”142
The Montana Supreme Court interpreted these provisions in a case in which a
private company sought to operate an open-pit gold mine near the confluence of two
rivers.143 The company requested permission to pump groundwater to help determine the
long-term response to dewatering at the project. The water contained arsenic. In
challenging the state’s approval, environmental groups sought to require the company to
comply with statutory nondegradation requirements by blocking it from increasing
arsenic concentrations in the high quality surface waters affected by the project. They
also asserted that a statutory waiver of these requirements for certain discharges of water
approved by the state agency violated Article IX of the Montana Constitution.
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The court held that “the right to a clean and healthful environment is a
fundamental right because it is guaranteed” by Article II, § 3 of the constitution, and that
any statute or rule infringing on that right is valid only if the state shows a compelling
state interest and that its action is “closely tailored to effectuate that interest and is the
least onerous path that can be taken to achieve the State’s objective.”144 The court
concluded that the environmental provisions of the constitution were designed to be “both
anticipatory and preventative.”145 The rights provided in Article IX, § 1(1) were linked to
the legislature’s obligation in § 1(3) to provide adequate remedies for degradation. The
constitutional right to a clean environment and to be free from unreasonable degradation
was implicated because the pumping would have added a known carcinogen to the
environment in concentrations greater than those already present in the receiving water.
To the extent the statute excluded activities from nondegradation requirements without
regard to the nature or volume of the discharged substances, it violated the environmental
rights guaranteed by Article II, § 3 and Article IX, § 1 of the state Constitution.146
No other state has endorsed a constitutional right to nondegradation to the extent
that Montana has, and many states lack any constitutional protections for environmental
quality. Even in states with such provisions, the protections afforded to beneficiaries of
protected resources, and the obligations imposed on public officials to prevent their
impairment, are unlikely to be absolute. Instead, they may be constrained by economic
and social needs and values.147
B. Common Law Theories
Another possible source of state law recognition of individual or group rights to
protection against environmental degradation is state common law. The public trust
doctrine might provide a basis for arguing that a state must prevent degradation of good
air or water quality to comply with its sovereign obligation to preserve natural resources
it holds in trust for its citizens’ benefit. The doctrine traditionally was limited to
precluding a state’s divestiture of ownership of resources needed to assure public access
to navigable waters for purposes such as navigation.148 Some states now conceive of the
trust more broadly.149 A California court concluded that, although the doctrine evolved
principally to insure public access to tidelands and navigable waters, it is not limited to
those resources or that activity.150 In some states, the trust protects wildlife, although
such expansions may be statutory.151 California courts, among others, also have made it
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clear that the doctrine obliges as well as empowers,152 calling the doctrine “more than an
affirmation of state power to use public property for public purposes. It is is an
affirmation of the duty of the state to protect the people’s common heritage” in water
resources.153 In addition, judicial decisions in some states describe the public trust
doctrine in terms that seem to require preservation of the resources it protects.154 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court, for example, concluded that the state has a duty “to prevent
further pollution in its navigable waters.”155 Allowing resource degradation appears
inconsistent with a mandate to preserve natural resources in their current condition.
These kinds of broad characterizations of the scope and import of the public trust
doctrine have been rejected by some courts.156 But even if a state conceives of the scope
of the trust relatively broadly, no courts appear to have converted the general obligation
to preserve natural resources covered by the trust into a duty to prevent degradation of
clean air or water quality in specific contexts, or to have recognized an enforceable
individual right of trust beneficiaries to preclude the state from engaging in or authorizing
degradation caused by pollution. Even some courts that have described the public trust
doctrine broadly have acknowledged its limits, concluding that it requires a “delicate
balancing” of conflicting environmental and other social and economic demands.157
Because the public trust doctrine is not static, it has the potential to become the
source of a government duty to prevent degradation of trust resources due to pollution or
other environmental injury. One scholar has acknowledged that even in western states in
which the public trust doctrine has been interpreted most expansively, the rights it
protects “still remain focused on public uses of waters – not on the ecological and
ecosystem services values of aquatic and other ecosystems.”158 Nevertheless, she and
others have argued that the doctrine should (and perhaps has even begun to) provide
“both a rhetorically resonant articulation of the larger public interests in intact and
functional ecosystems and a means of imposing broad duties on governments to act for
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the long-term preservation of ecosystems and other environmental values.”159 One expert
has argued that courts in jurisdictions that have not yet relied on the doctrine to protect
the environment can and should develop it to protect resources based on standards and
policy statements in federal and state environmental statutes and regulations.160
Another potentially viable common law basis for protection against degradation is
state water law. Under the doctrine of riparian rights, landowners whose property is
adjacent to a watercourse are entitled to continued flow of the water in its natural state
and a right to reasonable use.161 Some states have interpreted this doctrine to provide
riparian owners a right to water in its unimpaired state.162 Further, as indicated above,
although nuisance law is often purportedly based on utilitarian principles, some judicial
decisions reflect rights-based protections against environmental degradation for private
property owners and perhaps for the public at large.
V.

CONCLUSION

Federal regulatory programs in the U.S. restrict deterioration of existing
environmental quality and limit backsliding by permit holders. These programs are not
based on any individual right to a given level of environmental quality. Instead, they are
supported by efforts to provide a margin of safety against miscalculations in identifying
safe pollution levels, protect high-value natural resources, protect the economies of highpolluting areas, limit interstate pollution, preserve opportunities for economic growth,
and force polluters to achieve feasible levels of control. State constitutional and common
law provide a firmer footing for rights-based nondegradation principles, but these laws
are not universally accepted and tend to be limited in scope. Nondegradation in the U.S.
is therefore more a matter of legislative and administrative policy than of enforceable
individual rights. That posture is not likely to change any time soon, notwithstanding
limited state recognition of a constitutional duty to prevent degradation and the potential
for an expanded public trust doctrine to accommodate efforts to forestall degradation of
environmental quality.
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